If now this something that constitutes the form of the living
being be the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without
the soul cannot exist; as would seem to be the case, seeing at any
rate that when the soul departs, what is left is no longer a living
animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before,
excepting in mere configuration, like the animals that in the fable
are turned into stone; if, I say, this be so, then it will come within
the province of the natural philosopher to inform himself concerning
the soul, and to treat of it, either in its entirety, or, at any rate,
of that part of it which constitutes the essential character of an
animal; and it will be his duty to say what this soul or this part
of a soul is; and to discuss the attributes that attach to this
essential character, especially as nature is spoken of in two
senses, and the nature of a thing is either its matter or its essence;
nature as essence including both the motor cause and the final
cause. Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the
whole soul or some part of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and
inasmuch as it is the presence of the soul that enables matter to
constitute the animal nature, much more than it is the presence of
matter which so enables the soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on
every ground to treat of the soul rather than of the matter.
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