This seems to be so very clear, that they must be strong objections
indeed, that can render it incredible.
There are but two that I know of, that are of any consideration, and
I shall not be afraid to represent them to you with their utmost
advantage; and they are these:
First, against the resurrection in general: it is pretended
impossible, after the bodies of men are resolved into dust, to
re-collect all the dispersed parts and bring them together, to be
united into one body.
The second is leveled against a resurrection in some particular
instances, and pretends it to be impossible in some cases only--viz.,
when that which was the matter of one man's body does afterward become
the matter of another man's body; in which case, say they, it is
impossible that both these should, at the resurrection, each have his
own body.
The difficulty of both these objections is perfectly avoided by those
who hold that it is not necessary that our bodies at the resurrection
should consist of the very same parts of matter that they did before.
There being no such great difference between one parcel of dust and
another; neither in respect of the power of God, which can easily
command this parcel of dust as that to become a living body and being
united to a living soul to rise up and walk; so that the miracle of
the resurrection will be all one in the main, whether our bodies be
made of the very same matter they were before, or not; nor will there
be any difference as to us; for whatever matter our bodies be made of,
when they are once reunited to our souls, they will be then as much
our own as if they had been made of the very same matter of which they
consisted before.
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