From these and other reasons, the numerical superiority
of the English was to some extent made unavailing. This
superiority, though exaggerated by French writers, was nevertheless
immense if estimated by the number of men called to arms; but only
a part of these could be employed in offensive operations. The rest
garrisoned forts and blockhouses and guarded the far reach of frontier
from Nova Scotia to South Carolina, where a wily enemy, silent and
secret as fate, choosing their own time and place of attack,
and striking unawares at every unguarded spot, compelled thousands
of men, scattered at countless points of defence, to keep unceasing
watch against a few hundred savage marauders. Full half the
levies of the colonies, and many of the regulars, were used
in service of this kind.
In actual encounters the advantage of numbers was often
with the French, through the comparative ease with which
they could concentrate their forces at a given point. Of the
ten considerable sieges or battles of the war, five, besides the
great bushfight in which the Indians defeated Braddock, were
victories for France; and in four of these--Oswego, Fort
William Henry, Montmorenci, and Ste.-Foy--the odds were
greatly on her side.
Yet in this the most picturesque and dramatic of American
wars, there is nothing more noteworthy than the skill with
which the French and Canadian leaders used their advantages;
the indomitable spirit with which, slighted and abandoned as
they were, they grappled with prodigious difficulties, and the
courage with which they were seconded by regulars and militia alike.
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