Nor were the British troops sent for their
support remarkable in the beginning for good discipline or
efficient command. When hostilities broke out, the army of
Great Britain was so small as to be hardly worth the name.
A new one had to be created; and thus the inexperienced
Shirley and the incompetent Loudon, with the futile Newcastle
behind them, had, besides their own incapacity, the disadvantage of
raw troops and half-formed officers; while against them stood an
enemy who, though weak in numbers, was strong in a centralized military
organization, skilful leaders armed with untrammelled and absolute
authority, practised soldiers, and a population not only brave, but in
good part inured to war.
The nature of the country was another cause that helped
to protract the contest. "Geography," says Von Moltke, "is
three fourths of military science;" and never was the truth
of his words more fully exemplified. Canada was fortified with
vast outworks of defence in the savage forests, marshes, and
mountains that encompassed her, where the thoroughfares
were streams choked with fallen trees and obstructed by
cataracts. Never was the problem of moving troops, encumbered
with baggage and artillery, a more difficult one. The question was
less how to fight the enemy than how to get at him. If a few
practicable roads had crossed this broad tract of wilderness, the
war would have been shortened and its character changed.
Pages:
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940