[801] The Governor, stiff at ordinary times, but pliant at
a crisis, welcomed the firmer mind that decided for him, consented
that the troops should return, and wrote afterwards in his despatch
to the Minister: "I was much charmed to find M. de Levis disposed
to march with the army towards Quebec."[802]
[Footnote 801: _Bigot au Ministre, 15 Oct. 1759. Malartic a Bourlamaque, 28
Sept_. 1759.]
[Footnote 802: "Je fus bien charme," etc. _Vaudreuil au Ministre, 5 Oct.
_ 1759.]
Levis, on his part, wrote: "The condition in which I found
the army, bereft of everything, did not discourage me, because
M. de Vaudreuil told me that Quebec was not taken, and that he had
left there a sufficiently numerous garrison; I therefore resolved,
in order to repair the fault that had been committed, to engage
M. de Vaudreuil to march the army back to the relief of the place.
I represented to him that this was the only way to prevent the complete
defection of the Canadians and Indians; that our knowledge of the country
would enable us to approach very near the enemy, whom we
knew to be intrenching themselves on the heights of Quebec
and constructing batteries to breach the walls; that if we
found their army ill posted, we could attack them, or, at any
rate, could prolong the siege by throwing men and supplies
into the town; and that if we could not save it, we could
evacuate and burn it, so that the enemy could not possibly
winter there.
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