The real directions of the Governor, dictated,
perhaps, by dread lest his rival should reap laurels, were to avoid a
general engagement; and it was only by setting them at nought that
Abercromby had been routed. After the battle a sharp correspondence
passed between the two chiefs. The Governor, who had left Montcalm to
his own resources before the crisis, sent him Canadians and Indians in
abundance after it was over; while he cautiously refrained from
committing himself by positive orders, repeated again and again that if
these reinforcements were used to harass Abercromby's communications,
the whole English army would fall back to the Hudson, and leave baggage
and artillery a prey to the French. These preposterous assertions and
tardy succors were thought by Montcalm to be a device for giving color
to the charge that he had not only failed to deserve victory, but had
failed also to make use of it.[671] He did what was possible, and sent
strong detachments to act in the English rear; which, though they did
not, and could not, compel the enemy to fall back, caused no slight
annoyance, till Rogers checked them by the defeat of Marin. Nevertheless
Vaudreuil pretended on one hand that Montcalm had done nothing with the
Canadians and Indians sent him, and on the other that these same
Canadians and Indians had triumphed over the enemy by their mere
presence at Ticonderoga. "It was my activity in sending these succors to
Carillon [_Ticonderoga_] that forced the English to retreat.
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