The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and
impracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as
an element in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville.
Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than
those of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise the
latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking
Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed,
when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on
Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious
as every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to
assault Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford.
In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how
unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from
Gen. Butterfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
"From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was
not over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg.
This information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday
by Gen.
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