In all these examples,
which might be multiplied to any extent, it is plain that changes of
conduct are moulded and determined by changes of opinion as to what is
best and most suitable for the circumstances of the individual, the
family, the tribe, or whatever the social aggregate may be. And I may
venture to affirm that, wherever any change of moral conduct takes
place, unless it be dictated by blind passion, or mere submission to
authority, enforced or voluntary, the change is invariably due to some
change of opinion on what constitutes the advantage of the persons whom
it affects. It is true, therefore, that moral conduct varies, and it is
true that our conceptions of well-being vary, but the two do not vary
independently of one another, or either of them capriciously. Increased
experience of ourselves and of others, enlarged observation of the
external world, more matured reflexion are constantly expanding and
rectifying our conceptions of what constitutes human welfare, and to
this constantly amended conception are readjusted, from time to time,
our conduct and our sentiments on the conduct both of ourselves and of
others. In brief, then, the conduct of men and the sentiments of men on
conduct vary with their conceptions of well-being, and their conceptions
of well-being are determined by experience (including the opportunity
for experience) and reflexion.
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