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Churchill, Winston S., Sir, 1874-1965

"An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan"

With that instinctive knowledge of war which is the
heritage of savage peoples, the whole attack swung to the right, changed
direction from north to east, and rushed down the trough and along the
southern ridge towards the Nile, with the plain intention of cutting off
the Camel Corps and driving them into the river.
The moment was critical. It appeared to the cavalry commander that
the Dervishes would actually succeed, and their success must involve the
total destruction of the Camel Corps. That could not, of course,
be tolerated. The whole nine squadrons of cavalry assumed a preparatory
formation. The British officers believed that a terrible charge impended.
They would meet in direct collision the swarms of men who were hurrying
down the trough. The diversion might enable the Camel Corps to escape.
But the ground was bad; the enemy's force was overwhelming; the Egyptian
troopers were prepared to obey--but that was all. There was no exalted
enthusiasm such as at these moments carries sterner breeds to victory.
Few would return. Nevertheless, the operation appeared inevitable.
The Camel Corps were already close to the river. But thousands of
Dervishes were running swiftly towards them at right angles to their line
of retreat, and it was certain that if the camelry attempted to cross
this new front of the enemy they would be annihilated. Their only hope
lay in maintaining themselves by their fire near the river-bank until help
could reach them, and, in order to delay and weaken the Dervish attack
the cavalry would have to make a desperate charge.


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