Thence by a long desert march he might reach the Nile and Berber. But while
his information of the Sirdar's force and movements was uncertain,
the British General was better served. What Mahmud failed to derive from
spies and 'friendlies,' his adversary obtained by gunboats and cavalry.
As soon, therefore, as Sir H. Kitchener learned that the Dervishes had left
the Nile and were making a detour around his left flank, he marched up the
Atbara river to Hudi. This offered Mahmud the alternative of attacking him
in a strong position or of making a still longer detour. Having determined
upon caution he chose the latter, and, deflecting his march still more to
the east, reached the Atbara at Nakheila. But from this point the distance
to Berber was far too great for him to cover. He could not carry enough
water in his skins. The wells were few, and held against him. Further
advance was impossible. So he waited and entrenched himself, sorely
troubled, but uncertain what to do. Supplies were running short.
His magazines at Shendi had been destroyed as soon as he had left the Nile.
The Dervishes might exist, but they did not thrive, on the nuts of the
dom palms. Soldiers began to desert. Osman Digna, although his advice
had been followed, was at open enmity. His army dwindled.
And all this time his terrible antagonist watched him as a tiger gloats on
a helpless and certain prey--silent, merciless, inexorable.
Pages:
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325