As long as Merawi and the other posts in
Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was capable of
easy defence. Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to Dervish attack.
The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on any threatened
point. At this moment in the campaign it was possible to stop and wait with
perfect safety. In the meantime the Khalifa would steadily weaken and the
railway might steadily grow. When the line reached the angle of the river,
it would be time to continue the systematic and cautious advance.
Until then prudence and reason counselled delay. To occupy Berber was to
risk much. Mahmud, with a large and victorious army, lay at Metemma.
Osman Digna, with 2,000 men, held Adarama almost within striking distance.
The railway still lagged in the desert. The Dongola garrisons must be
weakened to provide a force for Berber. The Dervishes had the advantage of
occupying the interior of the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed.
The troops in Berber would have to draw their supplies by a long and
slender line of camel communication, winding along all the way from Merawi,
and exposed, as a glance at the map will show, throughout its whole length
to attack. More than all this: to advance to Berber must inevitably force
the development of the whole war. The force in the town would certainly
have its communications threatened, would probably have to fight for its
very existence.
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