The plan was perfect, and the argument in its favour conclusive.
It turned, however, on one point: Was the Desert Railway a possibility?
With this question the General was now confronted. He appealed to expert
opinion. Eminent railway engineers in England were consulted. They replied
with unanimity that, having due regard to the circumstances, and
remembering the conditions of war under which the work must be executed,
it was impossible to construct such a line. Distinguished soldiers were
approached on the subject. They replied that the scheme was not only
impossible, but absurd. Many other persons who were not consulted
volunteered the opinion that the whole idea was that of a lunatic,
and predicted ruin and disaster to the expedition. Having received this
advice, and reflected on it duly, the Sirdar ordered the railway to be
constructed without more delay.
A further question immediately arose: Should the railway to Abu Hamed
start from Korosko or from Wady Halfa? There were arguments on both sides.
The adoption of the Korosko line would reduce the river stage from Assuan
by forty-eight hours up stream. The old caravan route, by which General
Gordon had travelled to Khartoum on his last journey, had been from Korosko
via Murat Wells to Abu Hamed. On the other hand, many workshops and
appliances for construction were already existing at Wady Halfa.
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