It cannot be denied that a battle, the climax to which all military
operations tend, is an event which is not controlled by strategy or
organisation. The scheme may be well planned, the troops well fed, the
ammunition plentiful, and the enemy entangled, famished, or numerically
inferior. The glorious uncertainties of the field can yet reverse
everything. The human element--in defiance of experience and probability--
may produce a wholly irrational result, and a starving, out-manoeuvred army
win food, safety, and honour by their bravery. But such considerations
apply with greater force to wars where both sides are equal in equipment
and discipline. In savage warfare in a flat country the power of modern
machinery is such that flesh and blood can scarcely prevail, and the
chances of battle are reduced to a minimum. Fighting the Dervishes was
primarily a matter of transport. The Khalifa was conquered on the railway.
Hitherto, as the operations have progressed, it has been convenient
to speak of the railway in a general manner as having been laid or
extended to various points, and merely to indicate the direction of the
lines of communication. The reader is now invited to take a closer view.
This chapter is concerned with boats, railways, and pack animals,
but particularly with railways.
Throughout the Dongola campaign in 1896 the Nile was the main channel
of communication between the Expeditionary Force and its base in Egypt.
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