This must be my
excuse for what I design to say in regard to the propriety of female
suffrage, because with that propriety established there is very little
difficulty in finding sufficient warrant in the constitution for its
exercise.
This case, in its legal aspects, presents three questions, which I
purpose to discuss.
1. Was the defendant legally entitled to vote at the election in
question?
2. If she was not entitled to vote, but believed that she was, and voted
in good faith in that belief, did such voting constitute a crime under
the statute before referred to?
3. Did the defendant vote in good faith in that belief?
If the first question be decided in accordance with my views, the other
questions become immaterial; if the second be decided adversely to my
views, the first and third become immaterial. The two first are
questions of law to be decided by the court, the other is a question for
the jury.
[The Judge here suggested that the argument should be confined to the
legal questions, and the argument on the other question suspended, until
his opinion on those questions should be made known. This suggestion was
assented to, and the counsel proceeded.]
My first position is that the defendant had the same right to vote as
any other citizen who voted at that election.
Pages:
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36