The
number of SAC wings increased from 21 in 1950 to 37 in 1952. The
growth of SAC air power arrayed US military capabilities and strategies
for massive retaliation and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by
NATO should the USSR launch a pre-emptive attack in Europe.
At least for the next several years, NATO and US planners admitted,
however, that neither massive retaliation nor MAD, by themselves, would
stop a Soviet first strike and an invasion into Eastern and Central Europe
and the Middle East. The USSR could count on huge reserves of its still
young, combat-seasoned men under arms, pre-positioned war materiel
still in good condition for combat, and relatively short lines of transport
and communications.
Operational ICBMs were still several years in the future. The B-52
bomber was still in the early stages of production and deployment.
Strategic warfare against construction and operation of Soviet oil drilling,
refining, storage, and pipeline facilities in the southwest USSR (Caspian
Sea area) were expected to slow Soviet military momentum. For this and
other reasons, the US expanded and modernized its existing facilities to
conduct air operations over the USSR's Eastern and Southwestern
regions.
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